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We show that grandfathering fishing rights to local users or recognizing first possessions is 
more  dynamically  efficient  than  auctions  of  such  rights.  It  is  often  argued  that  auctions 
allocate rights to the highest-valued users and thereby maximize resource rents. We counter 
that rents are not fixed in situ, but rather depend additionally upon the innovation, investment, 
and collective actions of fishers, who discover and enhance stocks and convert them into 
valuable  goods  and  services.  Our  analysis  shows  how  grandfathering  increases  rents  by 
raising expected rates of return for investment, lowering the cost of capital, and providing 
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The recognition that weak property rights have been the major cause of the 
world-wide  depletion  in  ocean  fish  stocks  has  led  to  the  adoption  of  rights-based 
management (RBM) in fisheries (Neher et al. 1989, Shotton 2000, Beddington et al. 
2007). Although the potential for RBM to improve fisheries is widely accepted, the 
mechanisms for allocating rights are controversial. By far the most common way of 
assigning rights has been to grant them on the basis of historical participation in the 
fishery (National Research Council 1999, Shotton 2000, Arnason 2002, FAO 2004). 
This practice is termed grandfathering or first possession (Epstein 1979, Rose 1985, 
Lueck 1995). 
Some economists, however, favor auctions over grandfathering. They contend 
that auctions allocate rights to users who place the highest value on the rights; that 
they transfer resource rents to the state (which can then distribute them beneficially to 
the polity); and that efficiency in resource use is invariant to the rights distribution 
mechanism (see Grafton 1995, Morgan 1995, Bromley 2009).
1  
In this paper, we examine the efficacy of grandfathering relative to other rights 
allocation  mechanisms.  Our  basic  proposition  is  that  grandfathering  increases 
dynamic efficiency compared to the alternatives. We maintain that natural resource 
rents, far from being fixed, evolve over time and can either expand or contract. They 
are increased by productive investments in fish stocks and ocean habitat, by finding 
new  fishing  opportunities,  by  implementing  improved  production  practices,  by 
developing new products and marketing processes, and by producing public (or club) 
goods through local collective action. These advances do not happen automatically. 
They require the appropriate incentives in the form of expected returns on investments 
undertaken relative to the cost of capital.  
Because natural resource rents constitute a significant part of the social wealth 
of many nations (World Bank 2006, 4), it follows that a major task of economic 
policy is to promote the expansion of such rents. Crucially, the act of fully or partially 
expropriating them generally will reduce the incentives for or the ability to undertake 
the  necessary  investments,  or  both.  Although  auctions  may  increase  short-run 
                                                 
1 Similar views have been expressed in other natural resource uses. For example, Parry et al. (1999) 
and Goulder et al. (2010) endorse auctioning allocations in a cap and trade program rather than 
grandfathering or free distribution because of the indirect advantages of using the funds to  
lower more distortive taxes. 2 
 
government revenue and maximize the share of resource rents going to the state, the 
investments required to expand future rents are discouraged by such transfers. Long-
term investments, by contrast, are encouraged by secure property rights that promote 
entrepreneurship and lower the cost of capital to firms that are in a position to exploit 
time- and place-specific information.
2 
To develop these arguments, we describe the movement toward RBM, discuss 
various  allocation  methods,  elaborate  on  the  role  of  rents  for  dynamic  efficiency, 
develop formal arguments of the economic advantages of grandfathering relative to 
auctions, and provide empirical evidence supportive of our arguments. We conclude 
by speculating as to whether the advantages of grandfathering rights in fisheries holds 
for  other  resources  and  calling  for  increased  research  on  the  long-term  effects  of 
property rights distribution mechanisms. 
 
II. Rights-Based Management 
Fishery rents are vulnerable to dissipation under common-pool or open-access 
conditions through excessive short-term harvest, overinvestment in capital and labor, 
underinvestment  in  stocks,  and  distorted  technical  progress  in  the  industry.  These 
losses  were  first  described  by  Jens  Warming  in  1911  (in  Danish,  translated  by 
Andersen 1983) and Scott Gordon in 1954. As suggested by Anthony Scott (1955), 
the fundamental cause of this waste is the lack of private property rights. The absence 
of clear property rights (informal or formal, group or individual) leads to dissipation 
of resource rents and prevents bargaining solutions of the type outlined by Coase 
(1960). With declining catch-per-unit-of-effort and depletion of the fish stock, the 
opportunity  for  fisheries  to  provide  a  basis  for  long-term  wealth  creation  is  lost 
(World Bank & FAO 2009, xvii). 
Prescriptive regulation to control entry and production has been costly and 
ineffective at halting the decline in fish stocks (see, for example, Johnson & Libecap 
1982, Shotton 2000, Beddington et al. 2007), thus returning attention to rights-based 
management (see Neher et al. 1989, Shotton 2000, Hannesson 2004, Stavins 2007, 
                                                 
2 Auctions transfer rents to the auctioneer, usually the state, in a similar way to Pigouvian taxes that 
extract resource rents (Pigou 1920, Baumol 1972). Although Pigouvian taxes are seldom used, relative 
tax rates across jurisdictions are important determinants of resource flows and investments. For a 
discussion of this, see Findlay (1978, 13) and Calomiris & Hubbard (1995). To the extent that auctions 
transfer rents, it is likely that they will have similar negative consequences for investment. 3 
 
Beddington et al. 2007).
3 For fisheries, individual transferable quotas (ITQs) were 
first suggested by Francis Christy in 1973 as a means of incorporating property rights. 
Under this arrangement, the total allowable catch (TAC) is set by regulators and catch 
shares are assigned to fishers as a property right to the flow of harvest.
4 Other rights-
based  mechanisms  include  territorial  user  rights  (TURFs),  sole  ownership,  and 
community rights (Arnason 2007b).  
By establishing property rights, RBM creates incentives and mechanisms for 
reducing the number of fishers and vessels, for increasing output-per-unit-of-effort, 
for  improving  access  to  capital  markets,  for  trading  rights  to  the  most  productive 
fishers, for encouraging investment in fish stocks and habitat, and for engaging in 
Coasean bargaining to reduce rent dissipation.
5 To be most effective, the rights must 
be permanent, secure, exclusive, and tradable (Scott 1989, Arnason 2007b).  
Economists have documented many advantages of RBM in fisheries. Grafton 
et al. (2006) outline the process and impact of ITQs. Hannesson (2004) describes a 
general  pattern  of  moving  from  uncontrolled  entry  to  centralized  governmental 
regulation (command and control) to the adoption of property rights of some type. 
Arnason (2000, 2002) summarizes international experiences with ITQs. Casey et al. 
(1995), Grafton et al. (2000), and Fox et al. (2003) demonstrate changes in harvest 
practices and product quality under adoption of ITQs in the British Columbia halibut 
fishery. Newell et al. (2005) and Arnason (2008) report rising quota prices in ITQ 
fisheries, implying the success of RBM.  Finally, using a global database for over 
11,000 fisheries from 1950 to 2003, Costello et al. (2008) find evidence that the use of 
catch
 shares generally halts and, in some cases, even reverses the declining trend in 




                                                 
3 The literature on fishery regulation is very large and we cannot be inclusive. Some relevant papers are 
those by Crutchfield (1961), Brown (1974), Anderson (1985), Homans & Wilen (1997), and Wilen 
(2000). 
4 The literature on design and implementation of ITQs is also large. For a discussion, see Grafton 
(1996). Arnason (2009) notes that fishers holding ITQs could collectively set the annual TAC. Chu 
(2009)  has  a  more  moderate  assessment  of  the  impact  of  ITQs  on  the  stock.  See  also  the  debate 
between Clark et al. (2010) and Grafton et al. (2010) on incentives to harvest and maintain the stock 
under ITQs. 
5 There  were  similar  gains  in  the  shift  to  emission  permits  from  regulation  in  the  SO2  emissions 
program in the United States. See Stavins (2007). 4 
 
III. Mechanisms for Allocating Rights  
Despite clear theoretical arguments and empirical evidence of how RBM can 
improve  fisheries,  the  adoption  of  such  systems  has  evolved  slowly.  In  2005, 
according to Arnason (2005), some form of ITQs were used by only 15 major fishing 
nations, accounting for perhaps 20 percent of global landings.
6 While this represents a 
great change from 25 years before when only two to three nations were using ITQs, 
most global fisheries are still harvested as open access or regulated common-pool 
resources. One of the main impediments to adoption of RBM systems is disagreement 
over how to allocate the rights. Here we briefly summarize the four rights allocation 
mechanisms. 
A. Political allocation refers to the direct assignment of property rights by 
government officials. This mechanism has a clear potential for rent seeking (Kruger 
1975, Buchanan et al. 1980).
7 It has rarely been used in fisheries perhaps because of 
the widespread respect for first possession, the specific information and human capital 
required  for  entry  into  the  industry,  and  because  RBM  typically  has  been 
implemented when fish stocks have been dangerously depleted, reducing available 
rents and their value as political rewards (Hannesson 2004, 111; Libecap 2008).
8 
B. Uniform allocation distributes equal shares to all fishers. It is attractive 
because it appears equitable and because it avoids the transaction costs associated 
with  designing  auctions  or  with  verifying  claims  based  on  past  production  for 
grandfathering. Moreover, if subsequent exchange of rights is allowed and the costs of 
trade are low, uniform allocation leads to an efficient solution via Coasean bargaining. 
The  resource  still  migrates  to  high-valued  users  and  rents  remain  in  the  fishery. 
Nonetheless, uniform allocation such as lottery distribution has not, to our knowledge, 
been used for fisheries RBM.  
C. First possession or grandfathering assigns ownership to existing fishers 
based on historical catch, capital investment, or some combination of the two. First 
possession  rules  recognize  current  parties,  who  have  experience  in  exploiting  the 
                                                 
6 Among these nations are: New Zealand, Australia, Namibia, Morocco, Chile, Peru, USA, Canada, 
Greenland, Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Russia, Netherlands, Estonia, and South Africa. Costello et al. 
(2008) provide an estimate of smaller coverage of ITQs, at 2% of the world’s fisheries. The economics 
literature on fishery RBM is large and we do not summarize its broad coverage here.  
7 Competition for resource rents in the presence of weak institutions results in rent dissipation and the 
so-called resource curse. See Sachs &Warner (2001) and Torvik (2002). 
8 Namibia and South Africa are examples of countries where political allocation of fishing rights has 
been used. 5 
 
resource. As noted above, it is the most common allocation mechanism for fisheries 
(Shotton 2000, Hatcher et al. 2001, Arnason 2002, Libecap 2007).
9 
D. Auctions allocate rights to the highest bidder with the revenues going to 
the seller, generally the state.
10 Therefore, not surprisingly, they tend to be favored by 
governments (Milgrom 2004). Auctions are commonly used to grant use rights for 
previously unexploited resources for which the state may have clear ownership, such 
as timber concessions, oil and gas leases, and the division of the electro-magnetic 
spectrum. Auctions have also been adopted for allocating emissions permits under 
cap-and-trade policies for various types of air pollution control and proposed in new 
programs for greenhouse gas regulation.
11 In fisheries, they have rarely been used.
12  
 
IV. Resource Rents from RBM 
Economic  rents  incorporate  several  distinguishable  components.  One  is 
Ricardian or resource rent, generated by an asset that is naturally relatively fixed in 
supply, such as land (Ricardo 1821, 34−5, 44). This is the surplus value above costs 
and  normal  returns  not  necessary  for  production  of  the  asset.  Another  is 
Schumpeterian  rent,  generated  when  the  value  of  the  asset  is  increased  due  to 
innovative activities (Schumpeter 1950). A third concept is inframarginal resource 
rent generated by individuals or firms characterized by greater skill, human capital, 
and/or risk tolerance in production using the asset. This rent is earned even in open-
access settings where only the marginal actors earn zero rents (Johnson & Libecap 
1982, Johnson 1995). Individuals with more skill and enterprise are more likely to 
invest and innovate and thereby generate additional Schumpeterian rent, an issue we 
                                                 
9  Equity  or  fairness  issues  are  major  arguments  raised  against  first  possession  as  part  of  the 
privatization  of  fisheries  (Bromley  2009,  McCay  2010).  McCay  (2010)  is  concerned  about 
consolidation in the industry under ITQs and the gradual decline of fishing communities. She advocates 
community  rights  or  common  property.  The  conditions  under  which  common  property  regimes 
function effectively, however, are limited as outlined by Ostrom (1990, 90). Also, ironically, we argue 
that  grandfathering  is  most  likely  to  assist  small,  undiversified  fishing  firms  and  hence,  reduce 
pressures for consolidation due to lack of access to funding. 
10 The literature on the efficiency advantages of auctions is large (Vickrey 1961, Bulow & Roberts 
1989, Dasgupta & Maskin 2000, Milgrom 2004, Klemperer 2004).  
11 For a discussion of the arguments, see Goulder et al. (1997), Parry et al. (1999), Crampton & Kerr 
(2002), Goulder & Parry (2008, 160−61), and Goulder et al. (2010). 
12 We are only aware of four cases of auctions being used as a primary tool to allocate ITQ rights in 
fisheries—in certain fisheries in Russia and Estonia in the late 1990s (Vetemaa et al. 2002, Hønneland 
2005), in a few small fisheries for squat lobster, yellow prawn, black hack, and orange roughy in 
southern  Chile  (Pena-Torres  1997),  and  in  the  Washington  State  Puget  Sound  geoduck  fishery 
(Huppert 2005). In Russia and Estonia, the outcome of these auctions was found to be unsatisfactory 
and they were discontinued.  6 
 
emphasize below. Finally, there is monopoly rent, generated when the asset’s supply 
is artificially reduced in order to raise profits (Tullock 1967). Because monopoly rents 
are often short term and potentially competed away, they have been termed quasi 
rents (Klein et al.1978).  
Some  discussions  of  rent  allocation  mechanisms  in  fisheries  appear  to  be 
restricted to a static framework and regard rents as a constant (Clark et al. 1989, 
Morgan 1995). With that perception, resource rents may be seen as a “fortuitous gift 
of nature” (Bromley 2009, 14) that “can either be taxed away by the government or 
left  in  the  fishery  to  be  capitalized  into  the  value  of  the  ITQ”  without  efficiency 
implications (Clark et al. 1989, 138). Morgan (1995) presents the case for auctions of 
fishing rights apparently along similar lines, and Bromley goes a step further to say 
that “the government should tax away that excess profit and return it to the owner 
[the government] of the fish” (Bromley 2009, 15, emphasis added).
13  
  We  take  exception  to  the  presumption  that  efficiency  is  invariant  to  the 
allocation of rights. Our main reason is that it ignores the dynamic process whereby 
rents are created. Even the resources that generate Ricardian rents must be discovered, 
and discovery requires effort. Moreover, rents can be augmented by entrepreneurship 
and innovation (see Schumpeter1950). Once entrepreneurship is introduced into the 
production process, Ricardian and Schumpeterian rents cannot be easily separated. 
They  become  a  return  to  discovery  and  exploration,  research  and  innovation,  and 
other investments in the fishery, and not simply a “fortuitous gift of nature.” Our 
contention, therefore, is that taxing away resource rents reduces the incentives for and 
raises the costs of activities that discover and create rents. 
These  negative  effects  are  likely  to  be  most  important  for  more  efficient, 
inframarginal  fishers  who  apply  their  superior  fishing,  management  skills,  and 
knowledge  to  innovative  actions  that  raise  industry-wide  rents.  The  prospect  of 
obtaining and retaining these rents motivates producers to improve the productivity of 
the resource, to find lower-cost production methods, and to fund these activities. 
  Grandfathering rights thus increases the incentive for innovative discovery and 
investment by fishers and increases rents in three ways, all of which are less likely if 
rents  are  expropriated  by  government  via  lump  sum  taxes  or  auction.  First,  it 
                                                 
13 Curiously, in these arguments, little attention is paid to how the rents collected by the government 
might be distributed. Volden & Wiseman (2007), for example, discuss the political obstacles in the 
legislative process to using government funds to provide public goods, rather than rewarding special 
interests in the legislative process. See also Grafton et al. (2009) for a response to Bromley. 7 
 
generates higher private returns through generation of better information about the 
fishery,  investments  in  human  and  physical  capital,  new  marketing  efforts,  and 
investments to increase fish stocks.  
Second,  secure  property  rights  to  fishery  rents  reduce  the  cost  of  internal 
capital finance. Rent retention not only rewards past investment decisions, it signals 
the opportunity for similar benefits from future wealth-increasing actions. Risky new 
investments by entrepreneurial actors are difficult to finance in impersonal capital 
markets and therefore often must be funded internally by retained earnings or other 
informal sources. Evans & Jovanovic (1989) examine the role of liquidity constraints 
on entrepreneurial behavior and conclude that capital markets provide too little capital 
to  entrepreneurs  because  of  asymmetric  information,  moral  hazard,  and  adverse 
selection problems. This means entrepreneurs must finance themselves and bear the 
risk of failure.
14 
Like retained earnings in other enterprises, retained fishery rents provide a 
source of self-financing. All firms rely on internal financing, but risky new activities 
in particular, depend upon such sources (Myers & Majluf 1984).
15 The expropriation 
of retained earnings by any means increases firm-specific risk because of reduced 
funds and the greater likelihood of negative earnings outcomes. This increased risk 
raises  the  cost  of  external  financial  capital.  This  impact  is  felt  more  by  small 
undiversified firms  which are very  common in  fisheries, than by  large  diversified 
companies.  
  The third dynamic effect of grandfathering rights is that it encourages fishers 
to  undertake  collective  action.
16  Johnson  (1995,  337)  notes  that  a  quota  system 
“provides incentives for the industry to act collectively to lower costs and to engage in 
activities  such  as  product  development  and  fishery  management  that  have  the 
potential  to  increase  quota  value.”  Pooling  information  on  resource  availability 
increases  collective  rents  by  reducing  search  costs.  Cooperation  to  invest  in 
technology dependent on economies of scale is more likely if the returns on such 
                                                 
14 Evans & Jovanovic develop a static model of entrepreneurial investment and test it against National 
Longitudinal  Survey  of  young  men  over  the  period  1966−1981.  They  estimate  the  probability  of 
entering into self-employment as a function of assets and other variables. They find strong support for 
liquidity constraints on new startups. 
15 There appears to be a “pecking order” theory of corporate finance that says that corporations first use 
retained earnings, then debt (senior claims on the firm have lower asymmetric information costs), and 
then equity when debt capacity is exhausted (Myers & Majluf 1984). 
16 Deacon et al. (2008, 2010) document such collective action in the Alaska salmon fishery. See also 
Arnason (2009). 8 
 
investments  cannot  be  competed  away  by  unrestricted  entry  or  expropriated  by 
taxation.  Again  quoting  Johnson  (1995,  337)  “because  the  identities  of  the 
participants are known, organizational costs are lower than in an open access setting.” 
Creating collective rents requires undertaking coordination costs for which there is 
only a return once rights are established. Obviously, these group investments are risky 
with highly uncertain returns so that standard capital markets are less likely to provide 
funding.  Extracting  resource  rents  not  only  reduces  incentives  for  coordinated 
investment, but reduces the ability of participants to support such actions. 
The negative effects on all three types of rent creation are greater if there are 
repeated actions by government to extract the rents through new taxation or repeated 
auctions as new rents are generated. As fishers anticipate this, their incentives and 
funding abilities are reduced, and the rent-generating process is curtailed.  
 
V. A Formal Model of Rent Retention 
  In  this  section,  we  formalize  some  of  the  arguments  for  grandfathering 
described above. Due to limitations of space, we restrict the analysis to the impact of 
rent expropriation on the financial costs of investments. We compare grandfathering 
to a once-and-for-all auction because it creates the least distortion (Arnason 2007a). 
The analysis proceeds in three step steps. First, we establish that auctions reduce the 
wealth of the successful bidders. Second, we argue that reduced wealth will lead to 
higher costs of financial capital to the company. Third, we show that higher capital 
costs will lead to less investment in research and development and, therefore, lower 
resource rents in the future.  
Consider a company with resource use rights. Let the maximum present value 
of the profits function of this company at resource level x(0) and efficiency level f(0) 
be V(x(0),f(0)). Thus, before the auction, the wealth of this company is V(x(0),f(0)) 




Let the auction price be A. Then, following the auction, the wealth of the  
 





Note that if the auction is truly competitive, A»V(x(0),f(0)) so W(1)»w. 
 
Now, let us assume that perfect capital markets are accessible to this company. 
In these markets, the company will be faced with financial capital prices. The prices at 
which it can borrow depend, among other things, on the default risk associated with 
the company perceived by potential lenders (Merton 1974). Clearly, ceteris paribus, 
this  risk  is  a  declining  function  of  the  company’s  wealth―higher  wealth  implies 
greater  ability  to  pay  if  things  go  wrong  and,  besides,  offers  a  wider  scope  of 
marketable collateral. Thus, other things being equal, the wealthier the company, the 
lower is its cost of capital.  
Let the profit function (on a cash-flow basis) of the company at a point of 
time, t, be: 
( ) ( ) ( ( ), ( )) ( ( ), ( )) t t q t x t C i t W t p f = ×P - . 
 
The  function  ( ( ), ( )) q t x t P is  the  company’s  base  profit  function  with  q(t) 
denoting  harvest  and  x(t)  biomass.  This  function  is  the  typical  profit  function  in 
fisheries economic analysis (Clark & Munro 1975, Anderson 1986). The technical 
coefficient, f(t), standard in dynamic production analysis, represents productivity due 
inter alia to R&D (research and development) (Solow 1957). This coefficient shifts 
the  profit  function  over  time  just  as  a  neutral  technical  progress  would  shift  the 
production  function.  Non-neutral  technical  impacts  on  the  profit  function  are,  of 
course,  possible  but  add  nothing  material  to  this  analysis.  Note  that  the  technical 
coefficient  in  the  current  context  is  a  wider  concept  than  in  standard  production 
theory.  It  represents  anything  that  shifts  the  profit  function,  including  marketing 
development, management improvements, organization changes, and so on.  
The  function  ( ( ), ( )) C i t W t represents  the  cost  of  R&D  with  i(t)  denoting 
investment in R&D and W(t) the company’s wealth. In accordance with the discussion 
above, we assume that both the cost and the marginal cost of R&D falls with the 
company’s wealth, i.e., CW, CiW<0.  10 
 
Note that this profit function contains two state variables, x(t) and f(t) and two 
control  (decision)  variables  q(t)  and  i(t)  determining  the  evolution  of  the  state 
variables over time. In order to simplify the presentation we will, in what follows, 
restrict our attention to the technical coefficient and its evolution in discrete time.  
In discrete time, let the change in the technical coefficient be:  
(1)  ( 1) ( ) ( ( )) t t F i t f f + = + , 
 
where the function F(i(t)) determines how investments in R&D modify the technical 
coefficient. Presumably, this function is increasing in investments, and we assume 
that this increase is diminishing with the level of investments, i.e., that the function is 
concave.  
Write the maximum value function (present value of profits) at time zero as: 
 






 is the company’s discount factor. 
 
Consider  initial  time  t=0.  At  this  time,  the  firm  is  faced  with  deciding  on 
investment in R&D and harvest. To focus on the investment decision, assume the path 
of harvests {q} is somehow exogenous, e.g., due to a harvest quota system. Thus, the 
path of base profits, { ( ( ), ( )) q t x t P }, is given too. At time t=0, the optimal choice of 
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By repeated substitutions into (2), we find:  
 
(3)  (0) (0)
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For equilibrium base profits (i.e., equilibrium harvest and biomass), p , condition (3) 
reduces to  
(4)  (0) (0) ( (0), (0)) ( (0)) i i C i W F i
r
p
= × . 11 
 
 
Differentiating (3) or (4) with respect to initial wealth shows that investment 
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And from (4) 
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On the assumptions made (Cii, Ciw>0 and Fii<0), both derivatives are unequivocally 
positive.  It  immediately  follows  that  reduced  company  wealth  leads  to  less 
investments  in  R&D,  and  therefore  less  future  rents  in  the  fishery  than  would 
otherwise have been the case.  
  The wealth effect on investments in R&D defined by (5) and (6) operates via 
the cost of financial capital, i.e., the interest rate demanded by providers of finance 
who require a higher risk premium from less wealthy companies and vice versa. In 
addition to this direct effect, it will generally be the case that changes in the interest 
rate on external finance will affect the company’s weighted cost of capital in the same 
direction and therefore also the discount factor used by the company to calculate the 
present value of profits (Ross et al. 2008). This further reinforces the above results.  
These arguments establish that extraction of rents, by auctions or other means, 
will  reduce  company  wealth,  increase  the  cost  of  capital,  and  generally  reduce 
investment in R&D.  
In  addition  to  the  effect  of  reduced  wealth  at  time  zero  delineated  in 
expressions (5) and (6), the reduced wealth in period one and in future periods will 
have a similar effect. Thus, there will be an accumulative impact on investments in 
R&D over time stemming from the initial extraction of rents from the industry.  
  Note that the marginal impact of wealth on the marginal cost of investments 
measured by the derivative Ciw in expressions (5) and (6) is likely smaller for a large 
diversified company than for a small specialized fishing company. Thus, by the usual 
laws of economic competition, auctions of fishing rights will, ceteris paribus, favor 12 
 
the  former  type  of  companies  and  encourage  concentration  in  the  industry—an 
outcome feared by other researchers (McCay 2010).  
 
VI. Empirical Evidence 
To test our arguments, we require comparable fisheries with different rights 
allocation mechanisms. We do not have such data, but there is supportive empirical 
evidence  from  several  fisheries  and  from  other  industries  consistent  with  the 
hypotheses that follow from our model. Below we provide evidence showing that: 1) 
fisheries  are  characterized  by  small,  specialized  companies;  2)  grandfathering 
facilitates the continuing existence of smaller, specialized firms that are more able to 
take  advantage  of  time-  and  place-specific  information  and  avoid  principal-agent 
problems  than  are  larger  companies;  3)  grandfathering  encourages  investment  in 
resource discovery and innovation in extraction; and 4) taxing rents discourages self-
financing and reduces expansion, especially in newer industries.  
 
A.  Rents Finance and Reward Small, Undiversified Fishing Firms  
We argue that rents increase with investments specific to fisheries but that 
there are asymmetric information problems that raise the cost of obtaining capital in 
formal  markets.  Hence  we  would  expect  fisheries  to  be  dominated  by  small, 
undiversified firms, and this is confirmed by FAO for several fisheries. According to 
FAO  (2007),  in  2004,  the  total  number  of  fishing  vessels  was  approximately  4 
million. This means that the average annual catch was just over 20 metric tons, the 
landed value of which was unlikely to be in excess of US$20,000 on average.
17  
Table 1 shows that the number and average size of decked fishing vessels in a 
few fishing countries is dominated by relatively small vessels with low engine power. 
The only exception is Iceland where the average vessels size is almost 200 gross tons 
(GT). However, the Iceland data, like those for the other countries, ignore a large 
number (at least 500) of undecked vessels (under 10 GT) which also participate in the 
fishery  on  an  occasional  basis.  For  the  rest  of  the  world,  especially  developing 
nations, the average size of vessels is even smaller.
18  
                                                 
17 According to the World Bank & FAO (2009, 9), the average landed price of fish in 2004 was US$ 
918 per metric ton. 
18 The data in the Table do not provide direct information about the size of companies―they could 
conceivably operate a number of vessels. However, it is our belief that the great majority of the world’s 13 
 
Table 1 Characteristics of fishing fleets in selected countries 
 
  China  South 
Korea 
EU-15  Iceland  Norway 
Number of 
decked vessels 
509,717  87,207  85,480  939  8,184 
Mean tonnage 
(GT) 
14  8  22  199  48 
Mean engine 
power (kw) 
30  192  81  493  162 
 
Source: FAO 2004 
 
The  Icelandic  decked  fishing  vessels  have  been  operating  under  an  ITQ 
system since the 1980s, but have not been subject to auctions of ITQ rights or other 
significant form of rent expropriation.
19 According to Icelandic Fisheries Directorate 
data, permanent quota share holdings of all companies in this fishery at the beginning 
of the 2009−10 fishing season were held by 571 companies and were assigned to less 
than 700 vessels. Hence, the great majority of companies operated only one vessel. 
The average size of each company in terms of quota share was less than 0.2 percent. 
This  corresponds  to  approximately  US$1  million  in  annual  turnover.  Only  three 
companies held more than 5 percent of the total quota.  
The size distribution of Icelandic companies is further described in Table 2. 
These data show that the Icelandic fishing industry is dominated by small or very 
small fishing companies. 
                                                                                                                                            
fishing companies (or concerns) hold only one vessel. Unfortunately, data on fishing companies are not 
routinely collected by the FAO.  
19 A special fishing fee has been imposed to pay for the cost of management.  14 
 
Table 2 Size distribution of Icelandic fishing companies 
Share of allocated quota  Number of companies 
Less than 0.005%  198 
0.005-0.01%  102 
0.01-0.02%  67 
0.02-0.05%  64 
0.05-0.10%  42 
0.1-0.15%  20 
0.15-0.25%  24 
0.25-0.5%  23 
0.5-1%  11 
1-2.5%  8 
2.5-5%  9 
5-10%  2 
More than 10%  1 
Total  571 
 
 
Source: Icelandic Fisheries Directorate 
 
  The California urchin and wetfish fisheries also are characterized by small, 
undiversified  operations.  The  urchin  fishery  is  very  gear-  and  knowledge-specific. 
With a mean length of 29 feet and a mean haul capacity of 6,410 pounds, vessels on 
the North Coast of California make day trips and support specialized dive equipment 
for  the  collection  of  urchins  (Scholz  et  al.  2010).  These  vessels  are  too  small  to 
support line or net towing, and the human capital associated with urchin diving is not 
easily transferable to other fisheries. Scholz et al. (2010) also found that the fishermen 
obtained 100 percent of their income from fishing and 88 percent of that from the 
urchin fishery.  
  Similarly, the wetfish fishery uses specific equipment and knowledge that is not 
readily  applied  elsewhere.  Wetfishing  is  defined  by  the  practice  of  offloading  the 
catch directly from vessel holds that are specifically designed to maintain the catch in 
water or ‘wet’ (California Wetfish Producers Association, n.d.). It includes northern 15 
 
anchovy, jack mackerel, pacific mackerel, pacific sardine, market squid, various tunas 
(bluefin, skipjack and yellowfin) and pacific bonito (Hackett 2002). Equipment and 
knowledge are relatively  malleable within this list and fishermen do fish multiple 
species (Pomeroy et al. 2002). The data in Table 3 reveal the relatively small size of 
vessels in the industry. 
 
Table 3 Characteristics of respondents’ vessels in the California wetfish fleet 
  MEAN  RANGE 
Length (ft)  60.1  19-86 
Net Tons  55.4
a  18-107
a 
Horsepower  357.2  165-750 












Source: Pomeroy et al. (2002). 
 
  The evidence in Tables 1, 2, and 3 and other anecdotal evidence showing that 
many fisheries are dominated by small, undiversified companies is consistent with our 
hypothesis  that  such  companies  generate  greater  dynamic  resource  rents.  Because 
fisheries are characterized by pervasive asymmetric information and principal-agent 
problems,  small  specialized  companies  are  better  at  internalizing  the  value  of 
location-specific fishery information, at monitoring on-board processing and quality 
control, and at adjusting to marketing.
20 If auctions of fishing rights tilt the balance 
toward large diversified companies, it follows that fishery rents associated with RBM 
will be reduced. 
                                                 
20 One indication of the asymmetric information and principal-agent problems in fisheries is the almost 
universal practice of remunerating fishing vessel crews with share in the value of the landed catch. A 
similar argument is made by Allen & Lueck (2002) regarding the pervasiveness of small family farms 
in the United States despite apparent economies of scale in agriculture. 16 
 
B. Rents Encourage Investment, Innovation, and Collaboration in 
Fisheries Management 
 
An example from the New Zealand abalone fishery illustrates investments that 
are rent-creating under grandfathered ITQs (Anderson & Libecap 2010). Until RBM 
was implemented in 1986, abalone divers needed only a non-transferable license to 
harvest in what was otherwise an open-access resource. Under these conditions, they 
harvested as much as possible and had no incentive to invest in the stock, which was 
declining due to open access.
21 RBM, however, provided divers with a tradable share 
in the TAC established by fishery authorities. As a result, quota values rose an order 
of magnitude in just five years from approximately NZ$33,000 per metric ton in 1988 
to NZ$320,000 per metric ton in 1993.  
Some of this increase resulted directly from reduced access, but additional 
returns were due to value-enhancing investments by individual fishers. To achieve 
these  gains,  the  diving  business  had  to  be  redefined.  Specialized  dive  boats  with 
support crews for harvesting abalone were introduced. Research into other abalone 
fisheries,  market  trends,  and  processing  operations  was  conducted,  and  abalone 
aquaculture  was  started  with  the  development  of  an  “aqua  barrel,”  a  molded 
polyethylene barrel in which abalone could be planted, grown, and harvested.  
For instance, Sea-Right Investments Limited obtained permits for developing 
a five-hectare marine farm site for abalone pearl culture in Akaroa Harbour, New 
Zealand, in 1994. The CEO, Roget Beattie described the importance of RBM for the 
success of his business: “Property rights changed the company from a hunter/gatherer 
at the ends of the earth to a business launching into the top end of the fine jewelry 
market  in  sophisticated  world  capitals”  (Sea-Right  Investments  Limited,  e-mail 
communication, December 2, 1999). 
Another example of investment encouraged by the prospect of retaining rents 
is drawn from Alaska. Deacon et al. (2008, 2010) describe the effects of a cooperative 
that operated between 2002 and 2004 in the Chignik sockeye salmon fishery. The 
fishery  had  suffered  from  overexploitation,  even  though  access  was  limited  by 
regulation of season, licensing, and equipment. In 2002, however, the Alaska Board 
                                                 
21 There was an indirect limit imposed on the abalone harvest because abalone processors faced a cap 
on what they would buy due to export quotas. These export quotas were neither property rights nor 
transferable, however, and so they did nothing to encourage divers to stop the fishery’s decline or help 
the fishery grow.  17 
 
of Fisheries approved a self-selected cooperative involving between 77 and 87 of the 
100 permits in the fishery. Because members of the cooperative shared in the rents 
created by the cooperative, they had an incentive to undertake the costs of collective 
action. These cooperative efforts included a) reducing the portion of permits actively 
fished to between 25−28 percent as compared to 92−100 percent for nonmembers, 
thus reducing pressure on the fishery; b) coordinating the location of harvest with a 
focus on lower-cost areas and positioning barriers or “fences” to channel fish so that 
they could be more effectively caught in nets; c) increasing the fishing season by 48 
percent;  d)  improving  fish  quality;  and  e)  increasing  the  quota  value  and  the 
associated rents by at least 25 percent (Deacon et al. 2010, 20−32).  
 
C. Rents Encourage Franchisee Investment 
As we have noted above, all firms rely on internal financing, but risky new 
activities are particularly dependent upon in-house financing because of asymmetric 
information  and  the  problem  of  volatile  expected  earnings.  If  franchisers  tried  to 
extract all of the Schumpeterian rents from franchisees, not only would they reduce 
the incentive for innovation, they would increase the cost of capital for innovation. 
Kaufmann & Lafontaine (1994) report that McDonald’s and other franchisers do not 
extract all (ex ante) rents via their royalties and franchise fees.  
Queues for McDonald’s franchises suggest that the company is not pricing the 
franchises  so  as  to  capture  all  of  the  rents.  Instead,  the  firm  leaves  some  rents 
available for the initial franchisees as an incentive mechanism for good operations, 
development  of  the  franchise  location,  and  investment  in  the  overall  franchise 
reputation  that  also  benefits  the  parent  firm.  Additionally,  McDonald’s  seeks 
undiversified, small operators focused on the potential rents from a new franchise. 
The  resulting  asymmetric  information,  however,  increases  downstream  liquidity 
constraints  and  raise  borrowing  costs.  Accordingly,  franchisees  must  rely  on  cash 
flow resulting from franchise rents.  
This practice applies especially for new franchises because they face greater 
uncertainty and more time- and place-specific information. For subsequent franchise 
sales, McDonald’s retains the right of first refusal, but also allows the franchisee to 
extract as much of the rents as possible in the sale. By that time, there may be less 
information  asymmetry  about  the  franchise,  making  capital  markets  a  more  likely 
source of capital.  18 
 
D. Rents Encourage Discovery and Innovation in U.S. Hard Rock Mining  
The U.S. hard rock mining industry in the 19
th and early 20
th centuries was 
notoriously  risky  and  initially  dominated  by  small,  undiversified  exploration  and 
mining firms. Clay & Wright (2010) build on David & Wright (1997) and argue that 
the U.S. minerals industry was able to develop rapidly because entry into exploration 
and patenting of mining claims was low cost. Procedures under the Mining Act of 
1862 allowed mining companies to retain rents and thereby encouraged exploration, 
adaptation, and innovation in hard rock mining.  
Early efforts to tax mining, beginning in California in 1850 and later with the 
federal mining law in 1866, were dropped not only at the insistence of the industry, 
but also because of the arguments of local governments seeking to promote economic 
development. The federal mining laws of 1866, 1870 and 1872 which still govern 
today, essentially established free mining discovery and development.
 22  
The United States was more thoroughly prospected than other countries such 
as Mexico, where property rights were less secure and rents were extracted, at least in 
part, by the state or politicians. Moreover, investment in risky new exploration and 
extraction techniques in the United States resulted in repeated expansion of economic 
mineral stocks, even as initial ore grades declined, generating substantial additional 
economic rents. Further, the innovative, entrepreneurial nature of the  U.S. mining 
industry encouraged the creation of and interaction with mining colleges throughout 
the country and the development of new mining technologies that added dynamically 
to the knowledge base. As a result, the United States became the world leader in 
mining technology and methods for extracting low-quality ores. 
 
E. Taxing Rents Discourages Self-Finance and Economic Growth 
In 1983, Ben Bernanke argued that one reason the Great Depression was so 
long and deep in the United States was the high cost of external financing and the 
associated  negative  impact  on  investment.  Calomiris  &  Hubbard  (1995)  use 
manufacturing firm-level data to test Bernanke’s claim by examining the effects of the 
Undistributed  Profits  Tax  of  1936−37  that  reduced  the  availability  of  in-house 
funding.  Between 1934  and 1939, 98 percent of investment funds of nonfinancial 
                                                 
22 It is the case that the Mining Law of 1872 is criticized today for the failure to require payments to 
cover  externalities  occasioned  by  mining.  These  are  legitimate  payments  and  not  wholesale  rent 
transfers that we caution against here.  19 
 
companies  were  supplied  internally  (Calomiris  &  Hubbard  1995,  445).  The  tax, 
however, changed payout strategies, reducing retained earnings at the firm level and 
the funds available for innovation.  
Taking advantage of differential impacts of the tax and costs of external funds 
across the firms within their sample, Calomiris & Hubbard find that the tax reduced 
investment  in  positive  net  present  value  projects.  Further,  many  of  the  most 
vulnerable firms with high surtax margins were concentrated in growing industries. 
The negative effects of the tax were apparent enough that the legislation was repealed 
as an impediment to the growth of young, dynamic companies—just the kinds that 
were necessary for expansion and recovery from the Depression.  
 
VII. Conclusion  
The adoption of RBM in many fisheries has demonstrated how this approach 
can mitigate losses from open access. Despite the economic gains from RBM, the 
mechanism  for  allocating  rights  ―  usually  to  existing  fishers  ―  has  been 
controversial. A major reason is distribution, that the increased value of the rights is 
for the most part captured by the initial recipients. 
Most  economists  who  argue  against  allocating  fishing  rights  to  existing 
fisheries  through  grandfathering,  implicitly  or  explicitly  assume  that  another 
allocation  mechanism  will  have  no  negative  efficiency  consequences.  This 
assumption seems to be based on the notion that fisheries rents (and rents from other 
similar resources) are naturally provided and independent of human action. Therefore, 
on equity grounds, rents should not accrue to existing parties, who by assumption 
have done little to earn them. Moreover, these rents can be captured via auctions or 
lump  sum  taxes  for  distribution  by  governments  for  public  purposes—perhaps  to 
reduce distortive income taxes—with no significant adverse effects.   
We contend that these conclusions neglect dynamic investment outcomes that 
can create and expand rents through discovery, technological advances, coordination, 
innovation  and  other  investments.  Moreover,  our  theory  suggests  that  firms, 
especially  smaller,  undiversified  companies,  rely  upon  internal  funding  to  take 
advantage  of  information  asymmetries  and  to  reduce  principal-agent  costs. 
Grandfathering rights increases rents relative to auctions and other mechanisms for 
extracting rents from RBM in three ways: 1) it retains industry-generated rents within 
firms,  thus  providing  rewards  for  rent-enhancing  investments;  2)  it  increases  the 20 
 
ability to self-finance besides lowering the cost of external financial capital associated 
with  asymmetric  information  and  principal-agent  problems;  and  3)  it  encourages 
collective action among rights holders that lowers information costs and reduces rent 
dissipation.  
Taking away resource rents, particularly through auctions, which are designed 
to fully extract them from the fishery, inevitably raises the cost of capital and reduces 
discovery  and  innovation.  Empirical  evidence  from  some  fisheries  and  other 
industries supports our argument that rent retention promotes discovery, innovation, 
collaboration, and self-finance. 
We have formulated out arguments mainly in terms of the fishery. However, 
the same basic arguments appear to apply in other natural resource use. In all cases  
RBM  would  improve  the  economic  efficiency  of  resource  use,  compared  to  the 
alternative, and the secure retention of the resulting rents by the rights-holders would 
encourage them to discover ways to take further steps for increasing the economic 
efficiency of the utilization.  
More  research  is  needed  to  test  for  and  measure  the  importance  of  rent 
retention for dynamic efficiency. Until that research is forthcoming, economists do 
not, in our opinion, have a reasonable basis for suggesting that the efficiency of RBM 
is invariant to the rights allocation and rent distribution mechanism.  
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